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THE STATE, CHEROKEE NATION, AND SAME-SEX




Legal issues surrounding marriage began to arise in the middle of the 1960s
with the decision of Griswold v. Connecticut, protecting the fundamental right
to privacy, including marriage.' Since that time, one of the issues on the
forefront is the recognition of same-sex unions as marriages, which are
regulated from state to state. It can be difficult to predict what turn a legal
interpretation may take, especially when dealing with a controversial issue such
as same-sex unions. With several same-sex marriages being challenged from
Maine to California, it is still surprising that this issue would come about so
soon in Oklahoma, a state traditionally seen as being deep in the "Bible belt."
Even more intriguing the possibility of a same-sex union within an Indian tribe
within the State of Oklahoma. Rather than obtaining a license directly through
the State of Oklahoma, one couple has gone right to a tribe for recognition.
Thirty-eight federally recognized Indian tribes exist within the State of
Oklahoma.2 Not all of these tribes have the ability to issue marriage licenses for
tribal custom marriage. Of those that do, most do not have a formal policy
prohibiting or allowing same-sex marriages.3 Only a few tribes, including the
Creek Nation and the Iowa Tribe, specify that marriage can only be between a
man and a woman.'
Currently, issuances of tribal marriage license are relatively rare. Most
Indians still file through the method offered by the State of Oklahoma, perhaps
without knowledge of the option of filing for a tribal custom marriage license.
For instance, the Sac and Fox Nation has only issued forty-one licenses in
* J.D./M.B.A., 2004, University of Oklahoma. The author is an Officer in the Marine
Corps. and will soon be leaving to being a career as a Judge Advocate General. Special thanks
should also be given to Gabriel J. Renfrow for his assistance in obtaining some of the
documents needed for the research used in this Note.
1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2. Sheila K. Stogsdill, Tribe Mulls Their Laws on Marriage, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, May
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nineteen years.5 The fact that Indian tribes have not been issuing licenses for
long may explain this widespread ignorance. If tribes have only been in the
business of administering licenses for two decades, the word may not have
gotten out. Perhaps like the general public, Native Americans are simply
accustomed to the traditional way of going to the local county courthouse and
filing an application for a marriage license. It is only by chance that a couple
decided to test the waters in Oklahoma in regards to same-sex unions through
a tribal government.
II. State Recognition of Tribal Marriage Licenses
The ultimate issue is not the fact that a tribe may recognize a same-sex
marriage. There is only a narrow application and affect if the license is only
valid in the realm of the issuing tribe. The real issue is whether or not another
sovereign should recognize the license as valid, in this case the State of
Oklahoma.
In the case now presented, legal minds from the tribe and the state were
quick to give a statement. The general counsel for the Cherokee Nation, Julian
Fite, stated, "The State has limits on recognizing certain actions of other states,
such as Oklahoma's ban on accepting same-sex marriages from other states. It
would be my assumption the same would go for tribal unions or marriages." 6
Drew Edmondson, Attorney General for the State of Oklahoma, glossed over
the issue of recognizing a same-sex union from another sovereign and viewed
it as just an Oklahoma marriage license. He stated, "Oklahoma law considers
marriage a contract between one man and one woman."7 Although the Attorney
General is correct, his statement does not address the recognition issue.
In Oklahoma, the issue of same-sex marriages was addressed several years
ago. The current statute on marriage in Oklahoma came into effect in 1910.8
Since that time there has been nine changes to the statue, but nothing to do with
language allowing only a man and a woman being allowed to marry.' The main
reason may be that the statute already spoke to the issue, just not explicitly.
The statute permits marriage with a person of the opposite sex. 10 This language
seems to implicitly rule out "same-sex" marriages with the prerequisite of the
5. Id.
6. David Zizzo, Marriage Could Force High Court Decision, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, June,
27, 2004, at 7A, available at 2004 WL 84116804.
7. Id.
8. 43 OKLA. STAT. § 3 (2001).
9. Id.




"opposite" sex. Even with this language, the Oklahoma State Legislature went
even further to secure marriage only between a man and a woman. In 1996, the
legislature added an addition to the marriage and family section of the
Oklahoma Statutes. This statute reads: "A marriage between persons of the
same gender performed in another state shall not be recognized as valid and
binding in this state as of the date of the marriage."" Not only does this statute
prohibit same-sex unions in Oklahoma, it also prohibits the recognition of such
marriages from other jurisdictions. 2
With the Oklahoma statute in place prohibiting the recognition of same-sex
marriage, this poses an interesting conundrum. The U.S. Supreme Court has
stated that the word territories in 28 U.S.C. § 1738 applies to tribal
governmental acts so that they are entitled to full faith and credit before those
states' courts.' 3 It may be that Oklahoma must give full faith and credit to a
tribal same-sex union, if the tribal court actually ruled in the favor of the same-
sex couple. Given the fact that the state firmly prohibits recognition of any
(emphasis added) same-sex union, Oklahoma would not recognize it and it
would more than likely be litigated further to test the Oklahoma statute on
constitutional grounds. Regardless, Oklahoma does not have to automatically
recognize these tribal custom marriage licenses, but does so more than likely to
promote positive relations between the two sovereigns. Additionally, Drew
Edmondson, Attorney General for the State of Oklahoma, also pointed out the
Defense of Marriage Act of 2001 passed by the United States Congress declares
that no state, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe is
required to honor same-gender marriages recognized by any of the other
entities. '4
One caveat to the recognition issue is that Indian tribal custom marriages are
provided for under the Code of Federal Regulations. This Code has extensive
requirements including the issuance of the license through the Court of Indian
Offenses, the recording of the license within thirty days, age requirements, and
most importantly, the requirement of a written application of an unmarried male
and an unmarried female. 5 Therefore, the only alternative for a same-sex union,
as far as a tribal union goes, would only be available through the tribe itself,
which is the present case in the Cherokee Nation.
11. Id.§3.1.
12. Id.
13. David S. Clark, State Court Recognition of Tribal Court Judgments: Securing the
Blessings of Civilization, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 353, 362 (1998).
14. Zizzo, supra note 6.
15. 25 C.F.R. § 11.6 (1993).
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Ilf. Statement of the Case
A. Background of Couple
The case at hand deals with the application for marriage of a same-sex
couple in the Cherokee Nation. The couple is Dawn McKinley and Kathy
Reynolds of Owasso, Oklahoma. 16 McKinley is thirty-two years old and is the
assistant manager of a retail store.' 7 She also has one child.18 Kathy Reynolds
is a student working on a master's degree in criminal justice.'9 The two of them
became concerned about their legal status when Reynolds was admitted into the
hospital and McKinley was not allowed to see her since she was not "family,"
as defined by the hospital rules. 20 Additionally, the couple was worried about
the parsing of their possessions if something happened to one of them.21 Of
course, McKinley and Reynolds have not always had a solid relationship.22
B. Chain of Events
On May 13, 2004, when the court clerk was absent, a deputy clerk issued a
marriage license to McKinley and Reynolds. 3 A day later, Justice Darrell
Dowty, Chief Judge of the Cherokee Nation highest court, the Judicial Appeals
Tribunal, issued a thirty-day moratorium on any other such applications.24
Immediately questions arose on what authority the court had to bring such an
16. Respondent's Response to Petitioner's Response to Motion to Dismiss at 1, In re:
Marriage License of Dawn L. McKinley & Kathy E. Reynolds (Cherokee Dist. Ct. 2004) (No.
CV-04-36).
17. Donna Hales, Lesbians Marry with Cherokee Nation License, MUSKOGEE DAILY
PHOENIX & TIMES DEMOCRAT, May 19, 2004, available at 2004 WL 86897275.
18. Id. Dawn McKinley's child was in the second grade at the time of this court action.
Her child was suspended from Grove Elementary School for promoting homosexuality because




22. McKinley and Reynolds have had their differences in the past, as Tulsa County court
records show Reynolds filed a protective order against McKinley on June 14, 2002. McKinley
was ordered to leave the residence immediately. The order was dismissed June 27, 2002. See
Sheila Stogsdill, Cherokees Extend Marriage Restriction, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, June 19, 2004,
at 9A, available at 2004 WL 79557557.
23. Sheila Stogsdill & Judy Gibbs Robinson, Cherokees Working to Ban Gay Vows;
Lesbian Couple Obtain Tribal Marriage Application, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, May 16, 2004, at
IA, available at 2004 WL 79553368.
24. Stogsdill, supra note 22.
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action on its own volition. The Oklahoma Freedom and Equality Coalition did
not understand how such an order could be issued without a lawsuit being
filed.25
On May 18, 2004, the Rev. Leslie Kay Penrose married the two women.26
The couple gave vows according to Cherokee Nation traditions. After the
vows, Rev. Penrose pronounced them companion and cooker. Whether
purposeful or not, the vows were performed in a genderless manner. In the
Cherokee language the word for husband means "companion that I live with,"
and the word for wife means "cooker.,
28
After the Judicial Appeals Tribunal stopped all subsequent same-sex
marriage applications, the Cherokee tribal leadership began to react. Cherokee
Chief Chad Smith responded that the Nation would only recognize the
traditional definition of matrimony.29 The general counsel for the tribe then
provided a more concise response by the tribe. General Counsel Julian Fite said
it is his opinion that Cherokee law allows for marriage only between a man and
a woman.
30
Direct action against this specific application did not arise until June 11,
2004, when Todd Hembree, Cherokee Tribal Council attorney, filed a
complaint alleging that the application for marriage was invalid because the
same-sex couple was not qualified for marriage.31 After filing the complaint,
Hembree assisted the Cherokee Tribal Council in drafting an amendment to the
Cherokee Code to ban same-sex unions, which was subsequently passed
unanimously on June 14, 2004.32 However, there was some unrest among
25. Stogsdill & Robinson, supra note 23. David Cornsilk, a civil rights activist and heavily
involved in the Oklahoma Freedom and Equality Coalition, encouraged McKinley and Reynolds
to test the Cherokee Code in the first place. See Zizzo, supra note 6.
26. Donna Hales, Lesbians Marry with Cherokee Nation License, MUSKOGEE DAILY
PHOENIX & TIMES DEMOCRAT, May 19, 2004, available at 2004 WL 86897275. Rev. Leslie




29. S.E. Ruckman, Tribe Nixes Bid for Same-Sex Marriages, TULSA WORLD, May 10,
2004, at A9, available at 2004 WL 61470699.
30. Stogsdill, supra note 2.
31. S.E. Ruckman, Tribal Marriage Certificate Due Court Review, TULSA WORLD, June
12, 2004, at AI7, available at 2004 WL 61475298.
32. Chad Previch, Same-Sex Marriage; Cherokee Council Bans Gay Unions, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, June 15, 2004, at 8A, available at 2004 WL 79557041.
No. 2] NOTES
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council members, because the measure was not available for viewing by the
Tribal Council until after the meeting started.33
C. Cherokee Code
Prior to these events, the Cherokee Code was specific on who cannot marry.
This code stated that anyperson (emphasis added) who shall have attained the
age of eighteen years shall be capable in law of contracting marriage.34
Actually the only persons not allowed to marry are those nearer of kin than first
cousins, currently married, the insane, or "idiotic."35 At the time of the issuance
of the license, no place in the code reflected marriage as being only between a
husband and a wife.
The Cherokee Code was amended by Legislative Act 26-04.36 The amended
version had three crucial elements, which included substantive changes on who
may marry, a severability clause in case any parts of the act were declared
unconstitutional, and a declaration of an emergency.37 Under the Cherokee
Code, no law takes effect until thirty days after passage unless an emergency
is declared.38 If an emergency clause is in place and the measure is signed by
the Principal Chief, then the law becomes effective immediately.39 Just as the
original thirty-day moratorium on all marriage licenses by the Chief Justice of
the Judicial Appeals Tribunal did not affect the marriage license of McKinley
and Reynolds, this new legislative act cannot be retroactive and cause the
marriage license to be void. The only possibility is for the court to rule as such
on the merits of the law prior to the changes. It is at this point that the marriage
license litigation began.
IV. Court Pleadings
The court pleadings in this case are extraordinary. McKinley and Reynolds
represented themselves pro se; therefore, many of their legal arguments are not
based on legal precedence. Both parties thus far have filed an extensive amount
of pleadings including multiple responses as well as a plethora of motions.
Needless to say, both parties are continuing the debate on same-sex marriages
33. Id.
34. 43 CHEROKEE CODE § 2 (1892).
35. See id. § 3.
36. An Act Amending Title 43 ofthe Cherokee Nation Marriage and Family Act, Providing
for Severability and Declaring Emergency, No. 26-04 (2004).
37. Id.
38. 25 CHEROKEE CODE § 23 (1985).
39. See id § 24.
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through these court pleadings, while at times the redundancy within these
pleadings can be somewhat hard to follow.
A. Ex Parte Temporary Injunction
Todd Hembree, General Counsel for the Cherokee Tribal Council, filed an
objection on June 11, 2004, to the marriage license of McKinley and Reynolds
as a private citizen of the Cherokee Nation.4° The objection essentially asked
for two things. First, Hembree claimed that the individuals being of the same
gender do not qualify for a marriage license under the Cherokee Nation Code,
specifically the section regarding marriage.41  He also requested that a
moratorium continue on the filing of any marriage licenses, more than likely to
prevent an influx of requests for marriage applications for same-sex unions.42
John Cripps, Judge of the District Court of the Cherokee Nation, was quick
to respond, granting on the same day an Order restraining the issuance of same-
sex marriage licenses until further order of the court.43 The Judge also set the
matter for a hearing in regards to the marriage license of McKinley and
Reynolds, exactly one week from the day of the order, signaling a desire for a
rapid expedition of the issue.'
B. Application for Temporary Injunction
On June 16,2004, Hembree filed an Application for Temporary Injunction.45
Arguing that if McKinley and Reynolds were allowed to register their marriage
certificate, then irreparable harm would occur to the Cherokee Nation and
would make the Declaratory Judgment he filed on the same day moot without
having an opportunity to be heard.4 6 Hembree appeared to be arguing that he
technically had standing as a member of the Cherokee Nation, and the Cherokee
Nation as a whole would be harmed if the marriage certificate was registered.
On June 18, 2004, Judge Cripps issued an Order Granting Temporary
Injunction on the basis that both parties agreed to the injunction at least until
such time a hearing on the merits is heard or a dispositive order is entered.47
40. Ex parte Injunction at 1, In re: Marriage License of Dawn L. McKinley & Kathy E.
Reynolds (Cherokee Dist. Ct. 2004) (No. CV-04-36).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Order Granting Exparte Temporary Injunction, McKinley & Reynolds (No. CV-04-36).
44. Id.
45. Application for Temporary Injunction at 1, McKinley & Reynolds (No. CV-04-36).
46. Id.
47. Order Granting Temporary Injunction, McKinley & Reynolds (No. CV-04-36).
NOTESNo. 2]
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C. Petition for Declaratory Judgment
On the same day as the Application for Temporary Injunction, Hembree filed
a Petition for Declaratory Judgment.48 Hembree was quick to jump to the black
letter of the law, turning to Black's Law Dictionary to define certain terms.
Hembree claimed that Title 43 of the Cherokee Code refers to the gender
specific terms "husband and wife." ' 9 However, the specific portion of Title 43
pertaining to who may marry is noticeably absent of gender specificity. In his
petition it states that Black's Law Dictionary defines a husband as "a married
man; one who has a lawful wife living," while a wife is defined as "a woman
united in marriage to a man."'"
After clarifying the legal meaning of the words important to this issue,
Hembree then made a case for why the court should rely on the plain meaning
of the language and the original intent of the drafters. When determining the
meaning of language in any statute, it is proper to look at the statute as a whole
and apply the plain language of society in the time it was written.52 "As in all
cases of statutory construction, it is the task of this Court to interpret the words
of these statutes in light of the purposes the legislature sought to serve."53
Hembree focused a great deal on what the legislative intent may have been. He
believed Title 43 of the Cherokee Nation Code was based upon the Constitution
of the Laws of the Cherokee Nation in 1892. "Same sex marriages were not
part of Cherokee history or tradition. Cherokee society in 1892 did not allow
nor contemplate same-sex marriage. This Court should determine that same sex
marriage is not allowed under today's laws."54 The root of his Petition for
Declaratory Judgment was that the Cherokee Nation did not believe in same-sex
unions then and does not now.
Respondents' actions are an attempt to have the Courts redefine the
traditional concept of marriage within the Cherokee Nation. Simply
put Respondents are seeking to take advantage of a perceived "loop
hole" in our statute that if successful would fly in the face of the
traditional definition and understanding of marriage of the Cherokee
people.55
48. Petition for Declaratory Judgment, McKinley & Reynolds (No. CV-04-36).
49. Id.
50. 43 CHEROKEE CODE § 2 (1892).
51. Petition for Declaratory Judgment, McKinley & Reynolds (No. CV-04-36).
52. Eggers v. Olson, 231 P. 483, 486 (Okla. 1924).






On June 17, 2004, Judge Cripps set a hearing for the Petition for Declaratory
Judgment for July 16, 2004.56 The Respondents, McKinley and Reynolds,
answered the temporary injunction on July 12, 2004.17 It was a one-line
response stating that the only parties who will be harmed in Petitioner's claim,
if successful, is the Respondents. 8
D. Response and Motion to Quash
In addition to the answer to the temporary injunction, the Respondents,
McKinley and Reynolds, filed their response to the Petition for Declaratory
Judgment four days before the hearing scheduled for July 16, 2004. The
Respondents understood the Cherokee Code as "empower[ing] every person to
contract marriage, not restricting their choice of spouse."59 Respondents even
conceded the Black's Law Dictionary definition as husband being a male and
wife being a female, which is in some portions of Title 43.60 Their crucial
argument was that the black letter of the section describing who can marry
under the Cherokee Code says that "a couple take each other as husband and
wife, not that they be (emphasis added) husband and wife."61
In a somewhat confusing part of the response, McKinley and Reynolds
actually concede that "Black's Law [Dictionary] does (emphasis added) define
wife as female, and husband as male," just not in this instance.62 However, on
August 12,2004, the Respondents filed a Motion to Amend to Make Correction
to correct their previous statement in the Response and Motion to Quash.63 In
that correction, the Respondents said they do not concede that Black's Law
Dictionary "defines husband as male and wife as female in portions of the
Cherokee Code."' The argument that the Cherokee Nation Constitution should
supercede Black's Law Dictionary is also set forth in the Response and Motion
to Quash.65
56. Order for Hearing Petition for Declaratory Judgement, McKinley & Reynolds (No. CV-
04-36).
57. Response to Application for Temporary Injunction, McKinley & Reynolds (No. CV-04-
36).
58. Id.




63. Motion to Amend to Make Correction, McKinley & Reynolds (No. CV-04-36).
64. Id.
65. Response and Motion to Quash, McKinley & Reynolds (No. CV-04-36).
No. 2]
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Respondents next make a broad stroke argument. They say the Cherokee
Nation Constitution embraces the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, stating that
"the laws of the Cherokee Nation must be applied equally among its citizens
and if a law purports to restrict marriage as only [between] a male and female
the law is unequal and is therefore unconstitutional. 66
The Response and Motion to Quash then turned to the court itself. "If the
[District] Court finds that this law is so restrict[ing], [i.e., being
unconstitutional,] then the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the
case then rises to [a] constitutional question [that] is reserved for the Judicial
Appeals Tribunal," the highest Cherokee court.67 Other than the supposed
subject matter jurisdiction conundrum, the Respondents also claimed that the
court did not have enough information to decide this case.
This court has had no opportunity to hear evidence on whether or
not same sex marriages have ever existed in the Cherokee
Nation .... Further, the Court has not heard, nor received, any
information regarding the use of Cherokee language and the
interpretation of husband and wife as it is spoken in the Cherokee
language.68
McKinley and Reynolds then digress into nontraditional quasi-equitable
arguments. One issue raised was the fact that the Petitioner, Hembree, "ha[d]
access to legal documents, resources, [the] internet, and Black's Law Dictionary
that Respondents do not have."'69 For these reasons, they allege that "it would
be unfair to give Declaratory Judgment to Petitioner when Respondents have
not had equal opportunity to provide legal history that would provide
guidance," thus irreparably harming Respondents.7" Ultimately Respondents
appear here to believe that Petitioner was attempting to use his position as
general counsel for the Tribal Council to railroad a baseless claim against the
marriage. 7
Respondents then addressed the issue of the supposed loop hole in Title 43.
They argue that "a black letter reading of the enabling and prohibiting sections










exceptions, may contract a civil Cherokee marriage. ' 2 The Respondents
strongly argue against any notion of a loophole in the Cherokee Code. "The re-
adoption of the Cherokee Marriage Act in 1993 came [seventeen] years after the
state of Oklahoma amended its marriage act [defining] marriage between a man
and a woman."7 3 Ironically, the principle Chief of the Cherokee Nation at this
time was also involved in the re-adoption of the Cherokee Marriage Act. "It
was well known in 1976 and 1993 that same sex couples were seeking legal
civil marriage."'74 Essentially, the Respondents were claiming that if the
lawmakers feared the prospect of same-sex unions that laws would have been
changed to address this perceived problem. Of course, Respondents see the
reason why the issue was ignored in a different light. "[T]he Cherokee Nation
and its officials are bound by a Constitutional oath to protect, defend, and
promote the heritage, language, and culture of the People. 75 In this instance,
the claim is that Cherokee law regarding civil marriages does promote the
traditions of the Cherokee people, because it does not, at the least, prohibit
76same-sex marriages.
Finally, Respondent's also challenge Petitioner's argument, saying that the
"Petitioner could have filed an appeal of the marriage license of the minister
who performed the ceremony per the wording of Title 43.' Petitioner had
thirty days to appeal the license and, by not filing, missed the opportunity to
appeal, while Title 43 provides for no other appeal neither of ministers' license,
nor marriage certificates. 8 With no other outlet to appeal the marriage
certificate, Respondents believe Petitioner has no standing, because there is no
other means to bring such an action. Even with standing, Petitioner has shown
no harm, according to the Respondents. "In order for the Court to entertain an
appeal, the Petitioner would be required to show that some great irreparable
harm would occur if the marriage were finalized by the filing of the
certificate."79
E. Motion to Dismiss
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Quash.80 Respondents flatly claimed that Petitioner has suffered no harm and
therefore no possibility of getting relief, leading to a lack of standing.8'
Additionally, "Petitioner missed the window of opportunity to file" against the
license of the minister, with no provision available for appeals regarding
marriage certificates.82 Finally, Respondents do not believe this case belongs
in the Cherokee District Court, arguing the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction because Petitioner is asking the district court to interpret Cherokee
constitutional questions reserved for the Judicial Appeals Tribunal.83
McKinley and Reynolds then asked the court to force the court clerk to
comply with Title 43 by filing a Writ of Mandamus on July 12, 2004.
Specifically, they wanted the court clerk to comply with Title 43 and make a
record of the marriage certificate in the records kept for that purpose.' On the
same day, however, the court filed a Minute Order finding that the Petitioner's
Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Respondent's Response and Motion to
Quash, Motion to Dismiss and Writ of Mandamus should be set for hearing on
August 20, 2004. Subsequently, all were set for hearing and the case
continued.85
F. Motion for Enlargement of Time
The Petitioner, Hembree, had extracurricular activities outside of this lawsuit
that were also taking a great deal of time but still had motives related to the
lawsuit. Hembree filed a Motion for Enlargement of Time for these reasons on
July 14, 2004.86 In that Motion he requested ten more days to respond to the
pleading before the August 20th hearing.
Hembree had a few reasons for the request for extension. The most
important reason was that he was running for state senate, which concluded on
July 27, 2004.87 For this reason, Hembree felt that he did not have the required
time to devote to a constitutional issue at that time. Furthermore, "the
undersigned cannot, consistent with the obligation to adequately investigate,
evaluate or prepare for the pending motions without being allowed this
enlargement of time."88




84. Writ of Mandamus, McKinley & Reynolds (No. CV-04-36).
85. Minute Order, McKinley & Reynolds (No. CV-04-36).







Judge Cripps sent down two important orders that set the tone before the
August 20th hearing. The first was an Order Granting Enlargement of Time
filed on July 16, 2004.89 Judge Cripps granted Hembree's Motion, likely
because of Hembree's state senate race, arguably his motivation for filing the
suit. Judge Cripps also filed an Order on July 30, 2004, which clarified the
June 18th Order Granting a Temporary Injunction.9" "The restraining order of
June 18,2004 extended the temporary injunction filed June 11, 2004, pertaining
only to the matter in this case." 9' Judge Cripps thereby concentrated his focus
on the same-sex marriage issue.
H. Motion for Summary Judgment
Although the preceding motions were pending, Respondents continued to
fight through court pleadings. On August 12, 2004, Respondents filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment. Respondents were not happy with the fact that
Hembree had filed for an extension of time until August 6th and as of the day
of the filing of this Motion, Hembree still had not complied with the filing
deadline. Petitioner had not filed anything within the time allowed by the
court.92 Respondents also stated that they had "been forced to endure their
marriage being placed in limbo and subjected to extraordinary degrees of
scrutiny not imposed on the average Cherokee citizen's marriage. 93
The Respondents still relied upon the notion that Hembree did not have the
right to file and had no damages, only political motivations. Of particular
concern to the Respondents, besides all enumerated points in the previous
filings, was the "onerous notion that a private citizen, such as Todd Hembree,
could interject himself' into their domestic affairs.94 The focus was also on
Hembree's personal motivations. The Motion for Summary Judgment stated
Hembree was jeopardizing the "marriage of his fellow citizens to further his
own sinister and bigoted agenda." "Since losing his bid for a seat in the
Oklahoma Senate Race, Hembree's zeal for the case has obviously waned, since
he did not answer Respondents' filings within the expanded period of time." '95
89. Order Granting Enlargement of Time, McKinley & Reynolds (No. CV-04-36).
90. Order of Clarification, McKinley & Reynolds (No. CV-04-36).
91. Id.
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Respondents even took an indirect shot at the court by alluding to the notion
that this decision should be easily made due to the simplicity and clarity of the
black letter of the Cherokee Code. "Respondents are not lawyers and have not
had the luxury of being represented by one. However, even a casual study of
Cherokee law was all that was necessary to discover that Petitioner's claims...
were faulty in reasoning and inconsistent with Cherokee law."96
I. Response to Motion to Dismiss
On August 20,2004, Hembree finally filed a Response to Motion to Dismiss,
two weeks after the deadline. 97 Hembree began to use legal authority and
precedence from Cherokee court decisions. "In summary, the law of this court
generally follows the federal standing doctrine, this court will not allow the
hypertechnical federal complexities pertaining to standing [to] prevail over a
just and expeditious resolution of a case . ,98 In his fight for the standing
argument, Hembree also used precedence balancing Cherokee law with state
and federal law. "This court will balance the guidance provided by Federal and
State decisions in the interests of fundamental justice tempered byprudence and
guidance both by the entirety of our Cherokee Constitution."99 Hembree also
preys on the mistakes of Respondent by stating that they admitted in responsive
pleadings that in Title 43 there are references to husband and wife, and that the
traditional legal defmition of those terms are gender specific, even though the
Respondents corrected their position previously on this admission.'00 As for
standing, Hembree disclaims filing the action for purposes of harassment, but
instead believes the clarification of the Cherokee Code does justice for all
parties and the entire Cherokee Nation by defining the language.' 0 ' Lastly,
Hembree attacks the subject matter jurisdiction premise of the Respondents in
that, a constitutional question works through the court system first instead of
taking a direct route to the United States Supreme Court. Additionally, "[i]f
any party [were] aggrieved by the decision of the District Court then obviously
they would have their appellate rights as in any other case."'0 2 With this second
96. Motion for Summary Judgment, McKinley & Reynolds (No. CV-04-36).
97. Response to Motion to Dismiss, McKinley & Reynolds (No. CV-04-36).
98. Phillips v. Eagle, JAT-98-09 (Cherokee Judicial Appeals Trib. 1998).
99. Cornsilk v. Cherokee Nation, JAT-96-15 (Cherokee Judicial Appeals Trib. 1996).






round of Motions and Petitions, Judge Cripps filed a Court Minute on August
30, 2004, setting another hearing for September 17, 2004.103
J. Response to Motion for Summary Judgment
Hembree filed a Response to Motion for Summary Judgment on August 27,
2004.104 Although Hembree was overdue in filing his response, he attacked the
argument of the Respondent, claiming they "had ample time to review said
response. Therefore, Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment on this
issue is moot.' 1 5 Then, Hembree restated his previous position on standing.106
Finally, Hembree shows his irritation with the Respondents seemingly saying
he "is just plain wrong."1"7 He does so by restating that he "has cited Cherokee
Nation authority supporting his argument".
08
K. Response to Petitioner's Response to Motion to Dismiss
The Respondent's filed yet another Response to Petitioner's Response to
Motion to Dismiss on September 2, 2004."0 In this second Response, stand
firm on their claims that Petitioner does not have grounds for a hearing on the
merits."0 Respondents claim the petition is not sound, no standing exists, the
black letter of the law is clearly in their favor, and the district court has no
subject matter jurisdiction."'
The first attack was on the Petition itself. "The Judicial Appeals Tribunal
has previously held that 'In Re' actions are not in compliance with the law and
will be dismissed .... 12 In Grayson, the court dismissed the case for failure
to name a defendant in accordance with the Cherokee Code. "3 So, even though
the Respondents believed the original Petition lacked merit, they were
concerned about the preservation of the marriage. In essence, Respondents
feared that by not responding would be an equivalent to a default judgment in
103. Court Minute, McKinley & Reynolds (No. CV-04-36).









112. Grayson v. Tribal Election Comm., JAT-87-E2 (Cherokee Judicial Appeals Trib. 1987).
113. Response to Petitioner's Response to Motion to Dismiss at 1, In re: Marriage License
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favor of Hembree. "However, Respondents [still maintain that their] filings do
not cure Petitioner's procedural failure."' 4
The Respondents then focus on the issue of standing. The Judicial Appeals
Tribunal in numerous cases requiring a ruling on standing has cast a wide net
in its efforts to include the claims and hear the cases. "One theme continues to
ring [forth] in every case: the party filing the case must show harm."'" 5 The
argument was that Hembree failed to show harm, which is a fundamental
requirement of any case. "At no time did the court rule that [a petitioner has]
standing just because he was a Cherokee citizen.'16 "Hembree ... has not
shown the court any connection he has to the issue at hand or how the holding
of standing in Phillips v. Eagle would cloak him with standing.""' 7
The Respondents go even further in dismantling the standing argument.
"Petitioner is still attempting to compare apples and oranges, although the
oranges are nearer in color, they are still oranges.""..8 "For standing, harm must
be done or pending which can be calculated."
'" 9
Petitioner would have this Court open a Pandora's Box of harmful
standing claims that could destroy the status of civil contracts, not
just marriage, in the Cherokee Nation. 120 Petitioner is not the alter
ego of the Cherokee Nation, he is not cloaked in any constitutional
authority to represent the Cherokee Nation, nor is he anything more
than an employee of the Cherokee Nation. 2'
The JAT, the final word on Cherokee law, has found that standing, unique as
it is in the Cherokee corpus ofjurisprudence, is rooted in the legal construct that
to have an actionable cause, the party must be able to show harm. 2 2 "Petitioner




115. Id. at 2.




119. Response to Petitioner's Response to Motion to Dismiss at 1, McKinley & Reynolds
(No. CV-04-36); see also Cornsilk v. Cherokee Nation, JAT-96-15 (Cherokee Judicial Appeals
Trib. 1996).
120. Response to Petitioner's Response to Motion to Dismiss at 3, McKinley & Reynolds
(No. CV-04-36).
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Petitioner brought this suit in District Court, with all of its flaws,
thinking he could railroad a cause of action that would finish up his
dirty work by destroying the only marriage certificate issued to a
same sex couple. Unable to snuff out the life of the marriage of
Kathy Reynolds and Dawn McKinley, two human beings, he has
resorted to a suit of harassment under the guise of clarification of
law.
124
This pleading again discussed whether the Respondents concede to the
traditional legal definition of husband and wife. Respondents have asserted and
claim to be able to show that the terms of spouse in the Cherokee language are
translated into English as, "my companion," "the one I live with," and "my
cooker." These terms are gender neutral. 12' Respondents stick firm to these
definitions and again attack the motives of the Petitioner. "Petitioner's claims
are rooted in cultural and historic ignorance and an ethic bias that seeks to erode
an already fragile remnant of a once brilliant culture that embraced freedom of
choice for the individual in all aspects of his or her personal life.' 26
The final argument in that response is that there is still a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. The act creating the district court allows the district court
to hear cases that fall into four categories: crimes, civil cases, domestic relation,
and miscellaneous.' 27 Even though the point could be made that a marriage
application could fall within the broad context of domestic relations or
miscellaneous, Respondents obviously do not believe as such. Respondents
held firm to the fact that "[t]he JAT further held that the jurisdictional
restrictions on the District Court would be 'strictly construed' so that the
constitutional authority of the JAT would not be infringed."' 28
V Analysis and Conclusion
The continuing power struggle between Indian tribes and states usually
centers on crime and gaming. Controversy over marriages is rare. Indian tribes
have usually been able to follow their own traditions when it comes to
recognizing marriages. The United States expressly recognized the right of the
Cherokee Indians to regulate their own domestic affairs, and to regulate
(No. CV-04-36); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 5.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 6.
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marriages between members of the tribe by the laws of the tribe.'29
Furthermore, it would appear to be a settled principle of law, sustained by the
authorities that so long as the tribal relation exists among Indians, applicable
state law, including recognition of the validity of their custom marriages, does
not restrict their domestic affairs. 3° In Oklahoma prior to this dispute, a
consistent policy existed where Indian tribal custom marriage certificates were
recognized as valid by the state. In most cases they still are, except for this
special case, which collides with the Oklahoma statute not recognizing same-
sex unions.
With the state not recognizing the marriage, the question remains whether
McKinley and Reynolds will keep hope of having a valid marriage at least
within the Cherokee Nation. The outlook appears to be grim. The Cherokee
Code at the time of this marriage application was clearly genderless. On its
face, it seemed to support, or at least did not disallow, same-sex marriages. But,
the fact that the Cherokee Tribal Council changed the Cherokee Code also
bolsters this analysis. If the Cherokee Code did not support these marriages
according to a literal reading of black letter law, then there would be no need
to change the code.
Although the changes to the Cherokee Code are not retroactive, controversy
remains. The bleak outlook for this couple appears in the fact that the district
court judge has yet to make a decision on what seems to be a simple reading of
straight forward black letter law. If Judge Cripps believed in the plain meaning
doctrine, the only ruling would seem to be in favor of McKinley and Reynolds.
Instead, the Judge has ignored constant motions on both sides to decide the
case, and set the case for trial some time in 2005. On August 20, 2004, Judge
Cripps filed a scheduling order to dispose of pending motions in December of
2004 and express his intentions to have a trial to be announced.'3 ' The desire
of the district court to have a trial on an issue that seems so clear according to
black letter law and the events surrounding the changes of the Cherokee Code
could be a premonition that the court will put an end to the controversy with
some strong words that go against the validity of this specific marriage
application and set the tone for the ban of same-sex unions at least in one type
of sovereign, the Indian tribes. Only time and politics will tell what will happen
among the state and federal sovereigns.
Without considering politics or personal bias, it is hard to ignore black letter
law. Sometimes the law may not reflect the opinion of some or even the major;
129. Henson v. Johnson, 246 P. 868 (Okla. 1926).
130. Kunkel v. Barnett, 10 F.2d 804, 806 (N.D. Okla. 1926).
131. Scheduling Order, McKinley & Reynolds (No. CV-04-36).
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however, it is still the law. In this case the law has now been changed,
indicating that same-sex marriages were allowed or at least that the allowance
of such marriages was vague. The law cannot be retroactive; therefore, this
issue should not be decided with the new law as a guide, no matter how many
people may support it. Society, politicians, and even judges cannot change a
law to suit a particular case. In order for our legal system to remain legitimate,
we must not contradict it on a whim. The issue in this case should be decided
in a court of law under the premise of the law, whatever that may be under the
Cherokee Code.
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